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BLOC TRENDS  
30 NOVEMBER 1966

- 2 -

Canadian Foreign Minister Martin to the USSR linking them to Soviet-U.S. collusion and accusing Moscow of trying to induce the Vietnamese to stop fighting in return for a halt to U.S. bombing in the North.

Moscow's continuing assault on CPR rejection of united action to help Vietnam is highlighted by the 27 November PRAVDA editorial article and Brezhnev's 29 November speech at the Hungarian party congress. Other Soviet comment again calls attention to Soviet aid and to support for the four- and five-point stands of the DRV and NFLSV. Comment on Foreign Secretary Brown's visit stresses that Britain and the USSR hold differing positions on Vietnam.

WAR IN THE SOUTH

ARTICLE BY        The Cuu Long article,\* entitled "New Developments in the  
"CUU LONG"        Guerrilla War in South Vietnam," discusses the scope and  
                 potential of the guerrilla war in unusual detail. It is  
not clear what prompted the article at this particular time, but the  
content and Hanoi radio's treatment of it suggest disagreement over  
the conduct of the war including such basic factors as control and the  
role of the North Vietnamese.

The article is notable for its stress on the importance of "organizing the revolutionary masses" and for its treatment of the nature of the leadership in this effort. Cuu Long says "leadership over the guerrilla war in various localities is not limited to military matters and cannot be understood as mainly the task of military organs." He declares that given new developments, "we must further discuss the problem of leadership," and he goes on to say in a later passage that "the local NFLSV committees obviously play the leading role."

Cuu Long cites DRV party First Secretary Le Duan as well as the NFLSV Central Committee as his authority on the need to develop the guerrilla war movement on the basis of organizing the revolutionary masses. The Hanoi radio version of the article--only partially available at this writing--deletes a quotation from Le Duan on the subject as well as a subsequent reference to him. Other seemingly sensitive passages deleted by Hanoi include a statement that the tunnels, trenches, and other fortifications in the South are "more extensive" than the communist fortifications of the "Dien Bien Phu battleground." Hanoi also excises

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BLOC TRENDS  
30 NOVEMBER 1966

- 3 -

Cuu Long's unusual details regarding the composition of the guerrilla force: it reports his statement that forces waging guerrilla warfare include all the armed forces from the main-force troops to the regional troops, but it omits his disclosure that they also include "special armed forces, such as the special task force and the ranger force." Hanoi also excises a subsequent reference to "the special task force, the engineer corps, and surveillance units."

Hanoi truncates a lengthy passage in which Cuu Long discusses the organization of the different categories of troops--including "hamlet, village, and intervillage" guerrillas and "specialized and secret" guerrillas. Hanoi omits entirely his statement that the third guerrilla warfare conference, which Liberation Radio reported on 20 October, "determined the procedures for organizing the three types of forces at the basic level." (Hanoi media made a recent reference to the conference in a 19 November VNA report of an article on pacification in the Hanoi weekly TO QUOC. It referred to the conference as having been held at Cu Chi, Gia Dinh Province--a detail which Liberation Radio did not provide.)

While Cuu Long notes in passing that the "regulars" play the decisive role in the war as a whole, his major thesis is that at this stage guerrilla action can successfully counter the allies despite their troop buildup, superior weaponry, and air power. But in a passage reminiscent of his 7 September article, he shows dissatisfaction with the operations against enemy communication lines. Declaring that attacks against communication lines have strategic significance, he says that "if leadership and organization are carried out more realistically, we will deal blows of strategic significance on the heads of the U.S. troops."

Cuu Long concludes his article with the statement that "at present guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam suggests many great problems and is undergoing several developments which cannot be entirely dealt with here."